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Foreword 
 
India’s emergence as a major economic power over the last decade can be attributed 
in a significant manner, to its sustained efforts at technological learning and capacity 
building. Professor Amit Shovon Ray, who recently joined ICRIER as Chair 
Professor of Trade, Technology and Competitiveness, has been researching on issues 
of technology and R&D in India for now over a decade.  This paper puts together the 
set of research findings pertaining to India’s technology capability acquisition.   
 
The paper presents a comprehensive overview of India’s technological development 
with a view to understanding the role it has played in the process of India’s economic 
progress. It includes a discussion on the process of technological learning and catch-
up through appropriate policy designs including a favorable IPR regime pursued by 
India. The paper argues that India’s achievement have by and large remained confined 
to “minor” as opposed to “major” innovative capabilities. However, India has 
displayed significant competitive strength in routine (but skill intensive) tasks like 
coding (in software) or process development (pharmaceuticals), and perhaps less so in 
product innovation and processes that are at the frontiers of global technology. I am 
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Abstract 
 
India’s emergence in the world economy over the last decade, has often, in popular 
discourse, been attributed, at least to a large extent, to its sustained efforts towards 
technological learning and capacity building. In this paper we present an overview of 
India’s technological trajectory with a view to understanding the nuances of India’s 
technological capability and the role it has played in the process of India’s economic 
progress. Our conclusion is that while India has successfully nurtured its high-end 
human capital for technological learning and is poised for a smooth transition to a 
knowledge economy, there has been a tragic neglect of low end human capital 
investment for productivity gains in mass manufacturing. This can not be ignored 
while carving out an appropriate technological strategy for India for a sustainable and 
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I.  Technological Progress and Economic Growth 
 
For a very long time, economic theory highlighted capital and labour, the two primary 
factors of production, as the key driving force behind production and growth. It was 
only in the 1950s that technological advancement as an important source of growth 
was brought into the discussion of mainstream economic theory. Solow’s (1957) 
pioneering attempt to estimate the contribution of physical factors to growth, by 
introducing the technique of growth accounting, revealed that only 1/8
th of the growth 
of the US economy during the first half of the present century could be explained by 
the growth of its endowments of physical factors, leaving the remaining to a 
“residual” (termed as technical progress or total factor productivity growth (TFPG)). 
Focus shifted thereafter from physical factors to the role of technology in production 
and growth. It is fairly well established now that technological advancement resulting 
from R&D is the most important factor behind today’s productivity growth. 
 
Indeed, the growth experience of most advanced industrial nations has been driven by 
TFPG rather than by growth in factor endowments. For these nations, operating 
essentially on the frontiers of global technology, TFP growth necessarily implies an 
outward shift of the technological frontier. Of course, the contribution of TFPG to 
their economic growth has not been uniform across all industrialized nations. Hayami 
(1999), for instance, compared the sources growth in Japan and the USA during their 
respective high growth periods (1958-70 for Japan and 1929-66 for the USA) and 
found, not surprisingly, that Japan’s growth was attributable to both capital input 
growth as well as technical progress as opposed to the US experience of 
predominantly technology driven growth – TFP contribution being 53 per cent for 
Japan’s growth and 80 per cent for the USA. 
 
Even, for the late industrializing countries in East Asia (the so-called East Asian 
Tigers: South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan), the contribution of TFP 
has been observed to be much more moderate than the US experience. According to 
World Bank (1993), approximately two-thirds of the observed growth in these 
economies may be attributed to accumulation of physical and human capital and the 
rest came from total factor productivity growth. This is not to deny that productivity 
growth did play a very important role in East Asian success, but it was clearly not the 
sole (and not even the dominant) factor. 
 
However, equating productivity growth with technological progress a la Solow (1957) 
can also be somewhat problematic in understanding the growth successes of 
developing nations. Not all productivity growth is derived “pure” technological 
advancement. Rather, a large part of productivity growth may arise out of 
improvements in labor force and human capital accumulation leading to high levels of 
cognitive skills of the labor force that permit better firm level adoption, adaptation   2
and mastery of “given” technologies. In fact, Young (1995) makes an exemplary 
attempt to control for all changes in inputs, including improvement of the labor force 
as well as sustained capital accumulation, and found the residual TFP contribution to 
the growth of the East Asian Tigers between 1966 and 1990 to be abysmally low. It 
was 2.3 percent in Hong Kong, 2.1 percent in Taiwan, 1.7 percent in South Korea and 
0.2 percent in Singapore. Hence “technological improvement” in the neoclassical 
sense was perhaps not that important in facilitating the East Asian Miracle. 
 
II.  Beyond Neoclassical Perspectives: Technological Capability of LDCs 
 
In the neoclassical theoretical tradition, technological progress is identified with 
major breakthroughs in science and technology resulting in a shift of the frontier.
1 As 
a result, the important contribution to technical progress made in diffusion, adaptation 
and application of new technologies, which are particularly important in the context 
of LDCs, has remained under-emphasized. However, the evolutionary models of 
technological progress (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989) are 
perhaps the only theoretical constructs that consider minor, as opposed to major, 
innovations to be the more likely and more conventional research output of any R&D 
programme. These models have a broader perspective on technology defined as a set 
of linked capabilities based on different types of knowledge: formal and informal (i.e. 
tacit or experimental). Indeed, the evolutionary models’ characterization of technical 
change as a “tacit”, “path-dependent” and “non-linear” movement makes 
technological progress similar to the process of technological catch-up commonly 
observed in many LDCs. 
 
Lall (1987) observed that “considering technological progress only as a movement of 
the frontier is a highly simplified neo-classical view because ‘major technological 
innovations’ are not the only, perhaps not even the main, source of productivity 
improvement in the history of industrial development … and … minor changes to 
given technologies—to equipment, materials, processes and designs—are vital and 
continuous source of productivity gain in practically every industry”. Therefore, one 
can argue in line with Bell (1984) that technological effort should ideally be viewed 
as “conscious use of technological information and the accumulation of technological 
knowledge, together with other resources, to choose, assimilate and adapt existing 
technology and/or to create new technology”. This is what reflects technological 
capability of an LDC, defined as the capacity to select, absorb, assimilate, adapt, 
imitate and perhaps improve given (imported) technologies. Several case studies 
(country level, industry level and firm level) confirm that the creation of such 
indigenous technological capabilities requires conscious technological effort and risky 
investments in R&D. 
 
Accordingly, one must broaden the definition of technological output in the context of 
a so-called research production function of an LDC. R&D units in LDCs need not 
                                                 
1  See, for instance Schumpeter (1934, 1939). Note that Rosenberg (1976) has strongly criticized the 
Schumpeterian usage of the term “innovation” on four grounds: “(1) We confine our thinking about 
innovations to characteristics which are likely to be true only of major innovations, (2) we focus 
disproportionately upon discontinuities and neglect continuities in the innovative process, (3) we 
attach excessive importance to the role of scientific knowledge and insufficient importance to 
engineering and other ‘lower’ forms of knowledge, and (4) we attach excessive significance to early 
stages in the process of invention and neglect the crucial later stages”.   3
come up with very different products or processes but may still be acknowledged as 
an innovator, albeit of “minor” rather than “major” innovations. The distinction 
between minor and major innovations proves to be extremely important in 
understanding technological progress in developing countries.
2 
 
The stages of technological capability acquisition can be described as a process of 
path dependent evolution.
3 It begins with learning by doing followed by learning by 
adapting, aiming at augmenting productivity through efficient utilisation and 
adaptation of technologies at the shop floor. We call this the stage of production 
engineering. Next comes learning by design and learning by improved design, aiming 
at replicating processes and designs for better understanding and further improvement 
of given technologies. This stage is described as reverse engineering. All this 
culminates into learning by setting up complete production systems and learning by 
designing new processes which ultimately sets the stage for basic (frontier) R&D 
capabilities. 
 
Following Lall (1985), it is useful to categorise technological capability as “know-
how” and “know-why”. Know-how is acquired through “not only the assimilation of 
imported techniques (which itself can be a lengthy and active learning process) but 
also quality control (which also involves active technical effort), improved plant 
layout and production practices, slight modifications to equipment and tooling, 
troubleshooting, the use of different raw materials and so on”,
4 all of which can be 
summarised as production engineering. Know-why is the next stage of technological 
development, which involves the understanding of the nature of the process and 
product technologies leading to the development of new improved designs. Applied 
research and frontier R&D leading to major innovations follow this stage. 
 
Broadly speaking, know-how is expected to bring about rapid and immediate 
productivity growth in LDCs. Know-why, on the other hand, is absolutely necessary 
(but by no means sufficient) to create and strengthen the technological foundation of 
LDCs. Without going through this phase of know-why oriented technological learning, 
LDCs can never aspire to reach the global technology frontier to catch up with the 
levels of technological advancement of developed countries in the long run. However, 
there may not be any immediate pay-off of know-why oriented technological effort in 
terms of immediate productivity gains in the short and medium terms. 
 
What then are the technological options available to LDCs? In very broad and simple 
terms, there are two alternatives, not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
 
1.  Bring in latest imported technology (exploit the global frontier) and focus on 
know-how to reap maximum productivity gains. 
 
                                                 
2 Indeed, instead of recognising the key role played by the capability to invent around (minor 
innovations), the rise in competitiveness of Japanese industries in the mid-1960s was initially 
wrongly attributed to low labour cost advantage (along the lines of the product cycle paradigm). See, 
Rosenberg and Steinmuller (1988). 
3 Lall (1978) 
4 Lall (1985), page 116.   4
2.  Concentrate on know-why and applied research to create capabilities to 
generate new technology and attempt to catch up with the advanced nations on 
their own footing. 
 
Historically, LDCs have usually opted for different combinations of the above two, 
depending on their initial conditions and policy focus. Accordingly we may find inter-
country variations in the levels of technological capability acquired by LDCs. 
Evenson and Johnson (1998) have classified developing countries into six levels of 
technological capability. Countries belonging to the lowest three levels of 
technological capability generally do not undertake any R&D work. Though a little 
bit of R&D work is visible in the third level, it is mostly directed towards pirating of 
trade marks and design. In these three levels production technology is essentially 
purchased in an “inter-linked” contractual form. In the fourth and fifth levels of 
technological capability, the dominant objective of firm level R&D is to facilitate 
technology purchase, directly (licensing) or indirectly. Here the role of R&D is to 
create absorptive capacity to understand and adapt and implement the purchased 
technology successfully. Some adaptive invention is undertaken, usually stimulated 
by domestic intellectual property rights. The technological competence developed 
through R&D in these countries is instrumental in initiating activities of reverse 
engineering or imitation. In the sixth level of technological infrastructure, imitation is 
generally taken up as a conscious policy of technology generation through a more 
structured “buy-then-imitate” strategy. According to this classification by Evenson 
and Johnson (1998), India falls into the fifth level of technological capability while 
Korea belonged to the sixth level. 
 
III.  India’s Technology Policy Framework
5 
 
India is among very few, but perhaps not unique, less developed countries (LDCs) 
that have pursued a well-articulated technology policy providing the broad guidelines 
for technological development within the country. India’s technology policies 
included both direct policies for indigenous technological development as well as 
indirect policies for restricting and regulating technology imports and technology 
transfer. The first Scientific Policy Resolution was published as early as 1958 and the 
latest Technology Policy Statement appeared in 2003. Over this half a century, there 
has been a major shift in India’s policy stance towards technology development, 
roughly coinciding with India’s economic reforms and trade liberalisation in the 
1990s. Accordingly, India’s technology policy environment has been distinctly 
different in the pre and post-reforms period. 
 
III.1  Technology Policy in the Pre-Reforms Period (pre-1991) 
 
The basic objective of India’s post independence technology policy was “the 
development of indigenous technology and efficient absorption and adaptation of 
imported technology appropriate to national priorities and resources.”
6 Attainment of 
technological competence and self reliance was placed at the heart of India’s 
technological development. The aim was to achieve breakthroughs in indigenous 
technological development “appropriate to national priorities and resources” (i.e., 
                                                 
5 This section draws heavily on my earlier paper, Ray (2004). 
6 Technology Policy Statement of 1983, Govt of India (1983), page 3.   5
maximum utilisation of human resources, efficient use of energy, increasing 
productivity, maintenance of ecological balance). 
 
In fact, prior to 1990, the Indian economy operated within the broad framework of an 
inward looking policy regime of protection and interventions. Restrictions and 
regulations on trade and industrial production were pervasive. Against this backdrop 
of the overall policy framework, the main focus of India’s technology policy was not 
only to build up search-, selection-, implementation- and absorptive- capability, but 
also to acquire technological capabilities of adaptation and minor innovation through 
reverse engineering. 
 
Considerable resources were allocated for this purpose. Indeed, India’s share of 
national R&D expenditure in gross national product (GNP) had increased steadily 
from 0.17% in 1958-59 to 0.98% in 1987-88, the major share of which was borne by 
the Government.
7 The overwhelming majority of government R&D expenditure was 
allocated to various public sector research laboratories, under the auspices of the 
CSIR (Council of Scientific and Industrial Research) engaged in applied research in a 
wide range of fields including areas like aeronautics, experimental medicine, 
environment, oceanography and structural engineering. 
 
Apart from spending on R&D itself, the government also offered specific R&D 
incentives with the objective of building up domestic technological capability for 
rapid industrialisation. Prior to the 1990s, the main thrust of the R&D incentives was 
to generate indigenous technologies primarily in the institutional sector (public funded 
R&D institutions) and facilitate effective commercialisation, transfer and absorption 
of such technologies in the industrial sector. There were very few incentives at the 
firm level with the explicit aim of augmenting technology-creating capabilities. In-
house R&D was encouraged only to facilitate acquisition of technological capabilities 
of absorption, adaptation and assimilation. Special incentives were given to firms 
using indigenous technologies developed by R&D institutions. 
 
Apart from these direct policies to promote indigenous technology development, the 
Government has also adopted indirect policies for restricting and regulating 
technology imports and technology transfer. Till 1991, import substitution and 
technological self-reliance constituted the core of India’s technology policy, which 
was in line with its inward looking overall policy regime. Import of technologies in 
the form of licensing as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) was severely 
restricted in order to promote indigenous technology. The importer of technology had 
to obtain a clearance from appropriate government authorities after a thorough 
screening to make sure that there are no objections on grounds of high cost, 
“inappropriateness”, availability of local substitutes or even the long term building up 
of indigenous R&D capability. The onus lay on the prospective importer to show that 
the technology was necessary (in terms of plan priorities), not available locally and 
fairly priced (Lall 1984). 
Another indirect policy instrument has been the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Regime adopted by India. The Patent Act of 1970 did promote considerable 
technological learning and acquisition of technological capability through reverse 
                                                 
7 Even as late as 1998-99, 75.5% of the national R&D expenditure in India was borne by the 
Government.   6
engineering activities. This issue of IPR as a determinant of technological 
development will be discussed at length in a subsequent section. 
 
Thus, India’s technology policy in the pre reforms era was essentially grounded on 
building up of national level capabilities through the public institutions, while at the 
same the industry (private and public sector) was encouraged to actively engage in 
R&D activities to develop absorptive and adaptive capabilities of minor innovations. 
 
III.2  Technology Policy in the Post Reforms Era (post-1991) 
 
The decade of 1990s started with the ongoing thrust of integrating the Indian 
economy with the global economy in the GATT-WTO framework. From 1991, with 
the liberalisation of the Indian economy, restrictions on imports, FDI and technology 
transfer have been progressively removed. The technology policy also had to be 
moderated, and attuned to meet the new challenges of global competition. In fact, the 
Science and Technology Policy 2003 states that, “It is recognised that these objectives 
(of S&T policy 2003) will be best realised by a dynamic and flexible Science and 
Technology Policy, which can readily adapt to the rapidly changing world order. This 
policy, reiterates India’s commitment to participate as an equal and vigorous global 
player….” 
 
The decade of the 1990s saw a departure in the sense that government attempted to 
distinguish between fundamental R&D and commercial R&D, both in the private 
R&D units. It encouraged the creation of the so-called Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisations (SIRO) in the private sector for undertaking more 
fundamental R&D in a non-commercial manner. Such private sector R&D institutions 
might have existed even earlier, but in the late 1980s, they were given renewed 
attention and emphasis under the new name of SIRO. 
 
One contrasting feature is the shift of focus from national R&D institutions to R&D 
carried out by the industry either in in-house R&D units or in the SIROs. Industry 
captured the lion’s share of the incentives provided in 1990s compared to the earlier 
decade, when the majority of the incentives were directed to public R&D institutions. 
Indeed, post 1991, the thrust of R&D incentives showed a clear shift away from the 
institutional sector to technology generation by the industrial sector. In the post 
reforms period, industrial productivity and technological capability in a more market 
driven (profit maximising) framework have perhaps been given priority over 
indigenisation (import substitution) of technology and self-reliance. There has also 
been a move to encourage collaborative R&D between industry and R&D 
laboratories. 
 
The nature of some of the non-fiscal incentives also underwent significant changes in 
the 1990s, especially with the introduction of the new Patent Act of 2005 (to be 
discussed later). 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of R&D incentives in India in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
We notice a clear shift in the structure of R&D incentives in India and its underlying 
guiding principles over the period under study. 
   7
Table 1:  A Summary of R&D Incentives in India 
 
Incentives in the 1980S 
 









To Promote In-house 
R&D in Industry and 
SIROs 
 
•  Customs 
Duty 
Exemption 
•  Depreciation 
Allowance* 
•  Investment 
Allowance*  





*: granted to 











•  Duty free 
Imports  










•  Income Tax 
deduction 
•  Weighted Tax 
Deduction on 
Sponsored Research  
•  Tax Holiday 
•  Excise Duty 
Exemption 
•  Weighted Tax 
Deduction, industry 
specific 
•  Customs Duty 
Exemption to SIROs 
•  Excise Duty 
Exemption on 
Purchases made by 
SIROs 
•  Income Tax 
Exemption for 
donation to SIROs 
•  Excise and customs 




IV.  India’s Trajectory of Technological Capability Acquisition 
 
Against this backdrop of a well articulated technology policy over the last half a 
century, India’s share of national R&D expenditure in gross national product (GNP) 
had increased steadily from 0.17% in 1958-59 to 0.91% in 1988-89. Thereafter it 
started declining reaching a low of 0.71% in 1995-96 and finally it has settled around 
0.8% as per the latest available information.
8 This is rather alarming, especially in the 
context of the new economic policy regime of reforms and globalisation. In spite of a 
clear mandate of the Science and Technology Policy of 2003 to strengthen India’s in-
house industrial R&D in the post “liberalisation” period by raising the above share to 
at least 2% of India’s GNP by the end of the Tenth Plan, India has not even been able 
to reach the 1% target. It is worth noting that among the newly industrialised Asian 
countries, South Korea spends as much as 2.8% of its GNP on R&D, which is at par 
with industrialised nations, like US, Japan, UK and Germany. 
                                                 
8 R&D Statistics, Dept of Science & Technology, Government of India.   8
 
The Government’s R&D expenditure takes two forms: institutional R&D in Central 
and State Government laboratories and industrial in-house R&D in public sector 
enterprises, accounting for 62.6%, 8.5% and 4.5% of total (national) R&D 
expenditure respectively. There is small portion (4.1%) going to higher education, 
bringing the total share of the government in India’s R&D expenditure to 79.7%. The 
share of private sector R&D remains around 20%. Industrial R&D (public + private 
sector) constitute only 24.8% of total R&D.
9 This share is remarkably low compared 
to some of the East Asian countries, e.g. Singapore (60% in 1992), Korea (around 
80% in 1992) and Taiwan (50% in 1993). 
 
IV.1  Technological Achievements: Outputs, Expenditure in the Institutional and 
Industrial Sectors 
 
India’s post-independence inward looking policy regime did manage to generate a 
considerable amount of technological effort and development. To understand India’s 
trajectory of technological learning and technological capability acquisition, let us 
first take a quick look at the technological achievements in terms of R&D output. As 
already noted, public sector (institutional R&D) played the dominant role, especially 
during the pre-reforms period (pre-1990). In this phase, much of the technological 
effort went into creating technologies first time in the country rather than 
breakthroughs first time in the world and that too pre-dominantly in the public sector 
institutions.
10 This is perhaps expected as it conformed to the broad objective of 
creating technological self reliance in the pre-reforms period. However, it is doubtful 
whether these efforts of the public research laboratories have had “much impact on 
technological development in large scale organised industry, though it claims to have 
provided hundreds of technologies for use to small scale enterprises”.
11 More 
importantly, it is doubtful how efficient these indigenously developed “new” 
technologies were by international standards of costs and quality. 
 
As far as in-house industrial R&D is concerned, this import substituting policy regime 
typically fostered several conditions – no direct need to keep up with the global 
frontiers of technology, small size of operations, various input scarcities, and lack of 
adequate competitive pressures with respect to cost and quality – all of which 
dampened the effort to build up sustained technological capability at the frontiers. The 
absence of competition in any of the three key dimensions (domestic or internal 
competition, import competition, export rivalry) encouraged conservative 
technological behaviour on the part of the Indian firms preventing technological 
upgrading, let alone major innovations and breakthroughs. Moreover, restrictions on 
technology imports resulted in failure to promote effective transfer and absorption 
(know-how) of latest global technologies. Although, many Indian firms did manage to 
assimilate a lot of basic technology and even improved upon it, they remained far 
behind the global frontiers of technology. 
 
We have already seen that fiscal incentives for R&D have taken a new turn in the era 
of globalisation with the focus shifting from institutional to industrial R&D. Ray 
                                                 
9  See R&D Statistics 2004-05, Department of Science &Technology, Government of India. 
10 In very few cases in which “pioneering” technologies were created were those using typically 
Indianised raw materials, e.g. Amul Spray – a baby food technology from buffalo milk).  
11 Lall (1984), page 233.   9
(2004) takes a closer look at the profile and composition of R&D expenditure and 
outputs in terms of institutional versus industrial R&D over the period 1986-2000 and 
attempts to relate this with the structural changes in incentives. 
 
DST identifies various technological outputs and publishes it in their biennial R&D 
Statistics volumes. We have categorized these outputs in two groups: Type-1 output 
includes R&D outcomes like patents, product development, process development, 
development of new designs and import substitutes, which directly augment firm-level 
productivity and profitability.  Type-2 output consists of R&D outputs like 
consultancy services rendered and publication of books, papers and reports, which 
reflect technological capability through augmenting knowledge-base, but do not 
directly enter the firm’s production function, at least, in the short run. Table 2 reports 
the profile of R&D output. 
 




























1987 951 42083 16273 5916  0.06  7.11 2.75  0.02 
1991 3670  23527  13430 5609  0.27 4.19  2.39  0.16 
1993 2111  29778  11933 8342  0.18 3.57  1.43  0.07 
1995 1335  22290  9687 4283  0.14 5.20  2.26  0.06 
1997 2172  70849  13783 10690  0.16 6.63  1.29  0.03 
 
While the institutional sector puts more emphasis on type-2 output, industry puts 
more emphasis on type-1 output. The industry is more concerned with type-1 output 
for immediate gains in profitability and productivity. But the institutional sector 
during the 1980s perhaps followed a social mandate of enriching the public domain of 
R&D knowledge by producing and disseminating type-2 output. The situation has 
somewhat changed in the last decade. We find that industry’s share of type-2 output 
in total R&D output is increasing. This increase can be attributed to the changes in the 
R&D incentive structure, which does not intend to portray the public sector R&D 
institutes as the sole source of indigenous technologies and knowledge-base. Industry, 
in the changed scenario, has to appreciate the complementarities between the two 
types of R&D outputs – instant productivity gains through type-1 and augmenting 
knowledge base through type-2. 
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Table 3:  Share of Import Substitutes in Type-1 Output 
 
Year R&D  Inst  Industry 
1987 0.81  0.22 
1991 0.21  0.25 
1993 0.40  0.24 
1995 0.26  0.34 
1997 0.39  0.24 
 
Source: R&D Statistics, DST (Various Years) 
 
One interesting finding relates to the relative importance of import substitutes 
developed by the institutional and industrial sectors as revealed in table 3. The share 
of import substitutes in Type-1 output produced by the institutional sector declined 
from around 0.81 in the 1980s to around 0.3-0.4 in the 1990s. The industry, however, 
has maintained its share of import substitutes (perhaps a marginal increase) in Type-1 
output at 0.2. Note that the decade of 1980s had a clear mandate to develop import 
substitutes in both sectors which has been removed in the 1990s. We, however, 
conclude that the scope of cost effective import substitution by industry, especially in 
a profit maximizing framework, continues even with globalization and economic 
reforms. 
 
A comparison of aggregate nominal R&D expenditure also reveals some interesting 
turnarounds (table 4). While every sector has witnessed a growth in the nominal R&D 
expenditure their growth rates are far from being uniform. Moreover, there is also 
evidence of contrasting growth rate of a particular sector during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Overall during the entire period, the growth rate of the private sector R&D 
expenditure has been the highest followed by the growth of the state sector, central 
sector and public sector. 
 
Table 4:  Rate of Increase in Nominal R&D Expenditure 
 
  Central State  Inst_Agg Public  Private  Ind_Agg 
Inc 86-98  2.95  5.24  3.12  1.76  7.35  4.75 
Inc 90-98  2.05  1.81  2.02  0.57  3.30  2.09 
Inc 86-90  0.30  1.22  0.37  0.76  0.94  0.86 
 
Note (1)Inc86-90=(R&D1990–R&D1986)/R&D1986  (2)Inc90-98=(R&D1998–R&D 
1990)/R&D1990 
Source: R&D Statistics, DST (Various Years) 
 
However, as shown in table 4, during the 1980s, the state sector witnessed the highest 
rate of increase in R&D expenditure followed by private sector, public sector and 
central institutes. The decade of 1990s saw a reversal in this trend. Private sector 
emerges as the fastest growing sector, followed by the central R&D institutes. The   11
rate of increase of public sector R&D expenditure fell from 0.75 in the 1980s to 0.57 
in the 1990s. This picture seems to be compatible with the overall decline in the 
policy attention towards public sector enterprises. On the other hand, co-operative 
R&D between the private sector and central R&D institutes seems to have taken-off 
resulting in high growth rates of R&D expenditure in both the sectors. State sector 
growth rate also increased marginally. 
 
The impact of structural change in the R&D incentive structure is also visible in the 
pattern of the R&D expenditure by different sectors. The relative share of R&D 
expenditure by the institutional sector has been steadily declining. Indeed, the 
government R&D expenditure (especially in the state sector) witnessed high growth 
in the decade of 1980s, while the private sector R&D expenditure achieved the 
highest growth rate in the 1990s, perhaps due to the positive encouragement offered to 
the industrial sector in the new R&D incentive regime. It also appears that central 
R&D institutes has performed better than the state institutes in the decade of 1990s, 
may be due to better inflow of sponsored research received by some of them, which 
has been a key feature of the R&D incentive structure in the 1990s. 
 
IV.2  Total Factor Productivity Growth in Indian Industry 
 
Against the backdrop of India’s technological effort as described above, we now 
explore its experience with total factor productivity growth (TFPG). There have been 
several attempts to measure TFPG in Indian industry in different time periods. 
Ahluwalia (1991) summarises the results pertaining to the period up to mid 1980s. 
Long term TFP growth in this period has been negligible in India. Later studies 
extended the period and came up with similar pessimistic conclusions. Balakrishnan 
and Puspangadan (1994), for instance, find TFPG to be 0.33 during 1970-71 to 1988-
89. Unfortunately most of these estimates relate to TFPG at the aggregate industry. 
 
In a study undertaken for the Department of Science & Technology, Government of 
India, we attempted a more disaggregated analysis at the level of 29-industry 
classification.
12 Using a panel of 29 industries over 1975-76 to 1994-95, we estimated 
the following robust random effects model of cobb-douglas production function 
corrected for multicollinearity (using the ratio form) after confirming the hypothesis 
of constant returns to scale: 
 
Log (Q/L)it = α + β Log (K/L)it + λt + vi + uit 
 
The estimated values of the coefficients are: α = -5.48, β = 0.26, λ = 0.024, all 
statistically significant at 1% level. Our estimation thus revealed an overall TFP 
growth of 0.024 (2.4%) during this period. However, we also noticed substantial 
variation of TFPG across industries and over time and sought to explain this variation 
in terms of R&D effort by estimating a panel model of the following form: 
 
TFPGit = a + b RDit + γt + vi + uit 
 
R&D came up as a significant determinant of TFP growth. The time variable appears 
negative and significant over this entire period. This is indeed alarming. But we 
                                                 
12 Ray et. al. (1999), Ray and Bhaduri (2002)   12
intended to explore whether this reflects a secular decline in TFP throughout the 
period or has there been any structural break in the growth of TFP. To this end we 
used time dummy for each year beginning 1978 to estimate the following models: 
 
TFPGit = a + b RDit + γt + δ t*d + vi + uit 
 
where d=0 if t<x, 1 otherwise. This is to identify possible structural breaks at year x. 
We find a distinct structural break in the growth of TFP in 1982. After a long period 
of decline and stagnation, productivity in Indian industry displayed an upward 
movement. This break coincided with a similar break identified by Ahluwalia (1991) 
in Cobb-Douglas production function estimation of the Indian industry. 
 
More importantly, we also observed wide variations in TFP growth experience of 
different industries in our 29 classification structure. Only 8 out of 29 industries 
recorded positive TFP growth. Among these, E&E achieved a phenomenal 137% 
growth in TFP during this period. TFP growth in fertiliser and telecom sectors were 
73% and 50% respectively. Sugar and fermentation industries displayed moderate 
TFPG of around 30%. It may be worth noting that almost all sectors constituting the 
chemical industry experienced negative TFPG with the exception of fertilisers. 
Interestingly, in the three sectors registering highest TFPG (E&E, fertilisers and 
telecom), public sector’s contribution in total R&D expenditure is fairly high (43%, 
82% and 69% respectively). 
 
We then took a closer look at two of the different sectors reported above, namely, 
Chemicals (including Pharmaceuticals) and Electrical & Electronics (E&E). We 
selected these two sectors as these are the two of the most R&D intensive sectors in 
India as composite groups, but having divergent experience in TFP growth during this 
period. The E&E experienced a consistently high growth in TFP, which has 
contributed to 96% of output growth of this sector. The chemical sector, on the other 
hand, had a negative and declining TFPG. Output growth in the chemical has 
therefore been primarily factor driven and it is observed to be generally lower than 
that of E&E where output growth has essentially been TFPG driven. 
 
Posing these findings on India’s TFP growth experience in these two sectors against 
the Krugman thesis
13, one may be tempted to conclude that the technological 
experience of the E&E sector has been ideal for sustained growth while the 
technological effort in chemicals has not been that successful in India. But this 
completely contradicts the results we obtained from our estimation of production 
functions for these two sectors with R&D as a third factor of production (apart from 
labour and capital). R&D appeared to be a significant third input into the production 
of chemicals but not in the E&E sector. This is perhaps due to the fact that in E&E 
industry technology is largely embodied in capital equipment and is therefore not 
significant as a separate input into the production process. This is not the case in 
chemicals, where technology (R&D) is mainly disembodied and acts as a distinct 
third input. Indeed, the chemical industry, by its very nature, requires substantial 
adaptation and modification for making the product/ process suitable to local 
conditions (tastes, temperature, climate etc.), which  calls for a deeper understanding 
                                                 
13 The so-called Krugman (1994) thesis on the myth of Asia’s miracle suggests that the East Asian 
growth experience is bound to slow down as it has been fuelled essentially by mobilizing resources 
(capital) rather than through productivity growth and efficiency gains.   13
of the underlying technological process. By contrast, the E&E sector in India is 
characterised by the so-called ‘screw driver’ technology. Accordingly its 
technological effort is primarily geared towards better implementation of given 
technologies with little or no modification/ adaptation in order to achieve a greater 
degree of operational efficiency. 
 
Clearly then the process of technological capability acquisition and the trajectories of 
technological learning have been very different in these two sectors. It is hardly 
surprising each sector will follow its own distinct learning trajectory and generate 
distinct patterns of capability and technological advantages. 
 
IV.3  Technological Learning in Indian Industry: The Case of Pharmaceutical 
versus Electronics 
 
As discussed in section 2, the literature on technology in LDCs, pioneered by Nelson, 
Katz, Lall, Bell and others, recognized two principal characteristics of technological 
activities in LDCs. First, their R&D effort is geared towards “minor” as opposed to 
“major” innovations. Secondly, technological learning, in some form or other, 
constitutes an integral part of their research thrust. In an earlier paper (Ray and 
Bhaduri 2001), we examined the process of technology generation and learning in 
Indian industry by estimating a comprehensive research production function 




There has been little explicit theorization of the role of learning in the research 
production process. Arrow (1962) is perhaps the only theoretical construct 
introducing the concept of learning by doing in the neoclassical theoretical literature, 
but “there is little discussion even in that article regarding the nature of the process 
involved.”
15 In the context developing countries, Bell (1984) distinguished between 
two dimensions of the learning process: (1) ‘doing based’ learning and (2) ‘learning 
by training’ or ‘learning by hiring’ or ‘learning by searching’ or ‘spillover’. Both 
types of learning are equally important in the research production process in an LDC. 
Learning by doing, for instance, may not result in a research outcome which is 
altogether new (major innovation), but it certainly contributes to acquisition of 
technological capability (absorptive, adaptive) and the consequent minor changes or 
inventing around, which is crucially important in LDCs. We also expect that firms 
with longer experience will spend more on R&D. The justification comes from an 
evolutionary framework, where firms, which are successful in research, continue with 
their research activity and enlarge their R&D outfit. Learning through experience also 
raises the efficiency with which R&D inputs are converted into outputs. It thus has a 
positive impact on the amount of technological output by raising the marginal 
productivity of R&D inputs.
16 We, therefore, expect that ceteris paribus firms with 
                                                 
14 Such exercises have produced rich and useful results for developed industrialised nations. See 
Kamien & Schwartz (1975) and Cohen & Levin (1989) for comprehensive surveys of this empirical 
literature. 
15 Nelson (1987), pp 81. 
16 This is in line with the time-cost trade-off analysis by Scherer (1967) showing that curtailment of 
learning period makes the research production process less efficient by reducing the scope of trial 
and error.   14
longer history of learning (or with more experience) would produce more research 
output. 
 
With regard to the role of learning through spillover, the neoclassical literature is less 
precise as it assumes instantaneous diffusion.
17 However later developments 
recognized diffusion as a complex process requiring explicit effort and investment.
18 
This is true even for acquiring knowledge freely available in the public domain. 
Spillovers would then enter the research production process in a significant way. It 
would augment technological output in the same manner as learning by doing, but its 
impact on research effort is less obvious. We define two distinct sources of spillover: 




The econometric results obtained by Ray and Bhaduri (2001) presented new and 
interesting insights into the process of technology generation and learning in the 
Indian pharmaceutical and electronics sectors. We made a clear distinction between 
R&D inputs and R&D outputs in a research production function framework to 
understand the process of technology generation. We found that the conventional 
determinants of R&D, like firm-size, technology import or ownership, appear 
significant only in explaining R&D effort in line with existing empirical studies. 
However, when we sought to explain the variations in research output, none of these 
factors, not even research effort on its own, appeared to be statistically significant. 
Here in fact, learning, both experience-based as well as interaction (or spillover) 
based, proved to be the only important determinant of the research production 
process. According to Ray and Bhaduri (2001), therefore, technological learning has 
been the most important determinant of technology generation in Indian industry. 
 
First of all, learning through interaction (spillover) proved to be important in the 
research production process for both sectors. The effect of spillover on research 
output appeared to be non-linear. In both industries there was evidence of an optimum 
level of spillover (national as well as international). 
 
Learning through experience also entered the research production function for both 
sectors, although the way in which it augments research output differs across the two 
industries. In the pharmaceutical sector, it entered interactively with research effort, 
implying that firms with older R&D outfits spend on R&D more efficiently. In other 
words, experience based learning augments the efficiency of R&D effort in the 
pharmaceutical sector, which is mainly reverse engineering (through trial and errors). 
Research experience helps the firm to decode the technology faster, reducing its cost 
of trial and error and thereby making its R&D effort more efficient. In the electronics 
sector, on the other hand, learning through experience entered the production function 
as an independent input. Given that the electronics industry in India is driven by the 
                                                 
17 If at all, spillover was believed to have an adverse effect on the incentive to innovate. See Spence 
(1984). 
18 See, for instance, Cohen & Levinthal (1989). 
19 The theoretical literature is less precise about the pattern of learning of both types (through 
experience or through spillovers). It is evident from several empirical studies (Katz (1987) for Latin 
American firms, Lall (1984) for Indian firms, Jomo, Felkar and Rasiah (1999) for Malaysian firms) 
that the learning pattern as well as its importance varies from industry to industry and according to 
ownership structure.   15
so-called ‘screw-driver’ technology, simple experience based knowledge (of 
assembling) proves to be important in the R&D process. 
 
Indeed, the two sectors have followed two distinct trajectories of technological 
learning, resulting in different kinds of technological capability generation. In the 
electronics industry in India (characterized primarily by “screw-driver” technology), 
assembly operations, production engineering, shop-floor practices and quality control 
could prove to be the key elements of technological effort. In-depth technological 
learning of product designs and processes have perhaps been less important for 
electronics firms in India. Their technological effort lay primarily in gaining 
operational efficiency and productivity augmentation through shop-floor practices, 
day-to-day trouble shooting and customer servicing. Hence, it is know-how rather than 
know-why that best describes the learning trajectory of electronics industry in India. 
 
The pharmaceutical industry in India, on the other hand, followed a rather different 
trajectory of technological learning based on reverse engineering.
20 This essentially 
implies decoding an original process for producing a bulk drug. This involves a 
detailed understanding of the chemical properties of the active molecule, the 
excipients used and the chemical process of conversion from the active molecular 
compound to the final bulk drug. A chemical process incorporates a complex set of 
parameters, e.g., solvent conditions, temperature, time, stirring methods, use of 
various chemical and physical substances with different levels of purity etc., all of 
which have to be simultaneously optimised in order to arrive at the optimum process 
specification. It is possible to decode all of these parametric specifications of a 
process through reverse engineering. 
 
Indeed, from the decade of the 1970s, the industry acquired substantial technological 
capability of process development through reverse engineering, both infringing 
processes for off-patented molecules and non-infringing processes for patented 
molecules. This phenomenon has been often been referred to as the process 
revolution in the Indian pharmaceutical sector. 
 
Effectively then, the learning process has been largely know-why oriented in the 
pharmaceutical sector, while in electronics, it has perhaps been simpler and more 
know how oriented. We may expect a significant role of formal R&D in the learning 
process of the former. Learning in electronics, on the other hand, is likely to be less 
dependent on formal R&D.
21 It will be more learning by doing and learning through 
experience in this sector. 
 
IV. 4  Exporting through Technological Capability
22 
 
India’s technological effort has been primarily directed towards creating assimilative 
and adaptive capacities rather than generating new technologies. Although at the 
institutional level, some technology generation took place, but India remained far 
behind the global frontiers of technology in most industrial areas. The inward looking, 
protectionist policy environment till 1990 further bolstered India’s inability to use the 
                                                 
20 Ray (2005) 
21 The results of estimated production functions with R&D as third input for the two sectors reported 
above vindicate this hypothesis. 
22 This subsection draws heavily on an earlier work: Bhaduri and Ray (2004).   16
latest developments in global technologies though liberal and unrestricted imports. As 
a result, notwithstanding its impressive track record of technological learning, India 
continued to be “technologically backward” through out most of the five decades post 
independence. According to the conventional product-cycle or technology-gap 
paradigms of international trade, therefore, the technology factor is unlikely to be a 
key determinant of India’s comparative advantage and export competitiveness. In a 
recent paper (Bhaduri and Ray 2004), however, we have argued that India does enjoy 
technological advantages in exporting, but these advantages rest on a very different 
foundation – technological capability as opposed to major technological 
advancements or breakthroughs. 
 
To explain India’s technological advantages in exporting, we again refer to the 
distinction between know-how and know-why capabilities. Know-how is acquired 
through “not only the assimilation of imported techniques (which itself can be a 
lengthy and active learning process) but also quality control (which also involves 
active technical effort), improved plant layout and production practices, slight 
modifications to equipment and tooling, troubleshooting, the use of different raw 
materials and so on”,
23 all of which can be summarised as production engineering. 
Hence know-how oriented technological effort leads to greater production efficiency 
and therefore reduced marginal costs. Know-why is the next stage of technological 
development, which involves the understanding of the nature of the process and 
product technologies, ultimately, leading to the development of new improved 
processes and designs. Clearly, reduction of marginal cost may not be the overriding, 
or even an important consideration for such know-why oriented technological 
activities, at least initially. 
 
In explaining technological advantages for export success in LDCs, it is know-how 
rather than know-why, which has been highlighted in the literature as the key 
determinant.  It is generally argued that know-how oriented technological learning 
(production engineering) enhances firm-level competitive advantage by augmenting 
production efficiency. But technology creating know-why capabilities (reverse 
engineering) may actually reduce export competitiveness since reverse engineered 
processes and designs do not usually lead to greater production- and cost-efficiency, 
at least in the short run. 
 
However, sustained effort towards know-why activities may eventually lead to 
technology creating capabilities to invent around cost-effective processes or designs.
24 
This could then act as a major fillip to the LDC firms’ competitive edge in the long 
run and prove to be a key determinant of their export success.  Indeed, international 
competitive strength of Japan’s automobile industry and Korean semi-conductor 
industry was hidden in its capability to invent around, which evolved out of conscious 
long-term research effort on creating know-why capabilities.
25 
 
According to this conceptual framework, therefore, both know-how and know-why 
would act as important determinants of comparative advantage of LDCs. However, 
the relative importance of these two forces will perhaps vary from industry to industry 
depending on its technological characteristics and learning trajectory. 
                                                 
23 Lall (1985), page 116. 
24 Dore (1984). 
25 See Ungsan et al (1997).   17
To capture the precise nature of the impact of technological capability on export 
performance, Bhaduri and Ray (2004) introduced quantifiable (measurable) 
definitions of various facets of technological capability. In particular, we made a 
distinction between know-how and know-why oriented capabilities. Our econometric 
results, capturing the impact of these various facets of technological capability on 
export performance, revealed striking inter-industry differences. 
 
We found that know-how (or production engineering) augments export performance in 
both sectors but know-why (or reverse engineering) was important for pharmaceutical 
exports, not E&E. Indeed, as argued earlier, it is know-how oriented capabilities 
(production engineering, quality control for instance) that augments production 
efficiency and enables an LDC firm to remain internationally competitive. Know-why 
capabilities, on the other hand, raises export competitiveness only in the long run after 
a gestation lag of successful learning. 
 
One may of course ask why the E&E firms in India, unlike pharmaceuticals, are 
unable to augment exports through know-why capabilities. The reason perhaps lies in 
the different characters of the two products. While in both cases the global 
technological frontier is moving fast, in E&E the rate of product obsolescence is very 
high, whereas an old drug is never quite pushed out of the market even in the long run 
when a new “better” replacement arrives. Therefore there is ample scope and 
incentive to carry out sustained know-why activities of inventing around cost efficient 
processes and designs keeping in mind the off-patent segment of the international 
pharmaceutical market. Such long run prospects of pay-off from know-why do not 
exist in case of E&E characterized by high rate of product obsolescence. 
 
V.  The Role of IPR in Technological Capability Building 
 
We have already described technological capability acquisition as a path dependent 
process, which begins with simple production engineering (know-how) capabilities, 
followed by acquisition of know-why or reverse engineering capabilities that sets the 
stage for a paradigm shift onto basic research. The transition from know-how to 
know-why capability acquisition entails a trade off between short run gains in term of 
productivity augmentation (through know-how) versus long run benefits of creating a 
sound foundation for advanced technological capability of basic and frontier 
innovations (through know-why). 
 
It has now been widely recognised in the literature that intellectual property rights 
(IPR) policy has very significant implications for technological learning and 
technological capability accumulation in developing countries (Lall 2001, IPR 
Commission 2002, Dutfield 2005). However, designing an appropriate IPR policy for 
driving the economy towards an optimum learning trajectory involves a complex 
public choice problem due to the trade-off between innovation and diffusion that it 
entails. 
 
Economists belonging to the neo-liberal tradition do not hesitate to endorse the 
importance of incentives to innovate
26 and believes that a strong IPR regime that 
                                                 
26 Note, however, that the strength of IPR regime may not always raise the incentive to innovation in a 
linear fashion, especially if innovation is a cumulative process based on a pioneer invention. See 
Nordhaus (1969), Scotchmer (1991), Lerner (2001), Gallini (2002).   18
fosters such incentives for innovation (but restricts diffusion and learning through 
imitation and reverse engineering) would be the best policy option for a developing or 
emerging economy to embrace globalisation. Others, however, believe that 
developing countries are likely to lose out under strong IPR due to shrinking 
opportunities of imitative R&D and hence a weak IPR, facilitating diffusion and 
learning, could prove to be most important, for know-why type technological learning 
and catch-up (Helpman 1993, UNCTAD 1996, Lall 2001, Maskus 2000). 
 
While, the debate on optimum IPR policy continues, one is tempted to conclude that a 
weak IPR policy would perhaps be preferred over a stronger one in the initial stages 
of technological learning and economic development. But, once a country reaches 
technology maturity to achieve major breakthroughs, the benefits of protecting 
knowledge through strong IPR (incentive to innovate) might outweigh the benefits of 
diffusion. Hence, a strong IPR policy that encourages innovation may be necessary at 
a later stage after the country in question acquires innovative capability through 
learning. 
 
This essentially reflects that IPR policy can not remain static or invariant over time. It 
needs to be modified, fine-tuned and adjusted at various points in the technological 
learning trajectory of a nation, according to the nature and level of technological 
capability already acquired through this learning process. At the same time the nature 
and extent of technological learning will also definitely be shaped by the IPR policy 
adopted. In other words, technological learning and IPR policy have a strong mutual 
interface in the way they evolve. There is significant historical evidence of this 
phenomenon. Dutfield and Sutharsanan (2005), for instance, documents “numerous 
instances of how today’s developed countries often ensured they had weaker IP 
regimes than those of the technologically more advanced countries with which they 
were seeking to catch up”. 
 
Ray and Bhaduri (2008) attempt to provide a theoretical understanding of the 
interface between technological learning and IPR policy, using tools of applied 
microeconomics. We develop a game theoretic model to explain the optimum IPR 
policy and the corresponding technological learning in a developing country. Our 
model identifies the nature and extent of domestic technological learning under 
different IPR regimes, both being endogenously determined. 
 
Our model, although neo-classical in character based on rational behaviour and 
optimisation, arrives at a Nelsonian conclusion of co-evolution of technology 
(learning) and institution (IPR regime) with a strong interface between the two in their 
evolutionary process (Nelson 1994). In this co-evolutionary framework, the 
technological learning begins with know-how oriented production engineering 
followed by know-why oriented reverse engineering (RE) under weak IPR till 
sufficient innovative capability is acquired for basic research. At this point IPR 
regime is made stronger to enable firms to adopt basic research as a viable (and 
sustainable) strategic option. Without the introduction of a strong IPR as a negotiated 
order at this juncture, the transition to basic research will perhaps prove to be difficult 
and unsustainable. 
27 
                                                 
27 However, a pre-mature imposition of strong IPR, suppressing the evolutionary interface between TC 
and IPR, will not merely put a halt to the technological catch up process but will actually revert the 
learning trajectory back to the stage of production engineering.   19
As already noted above, the technological learning trajectory has not been uniform 
across all sectors in India. The technological trajectory of the E&E sector has 
essentially targeted towards achievement of high TFP (based on know-how 
capabilities) with little emphasis on acquisition of adaptive and designing (know-why) 
capabilities and therefore, IPR policy had perhaps little role to play in this regard. 
 
The pharmaceutical industry, on the other hand, focused on building up of know-why 
oriented technological capability, even at the cost of immediate productivity gains in 
the short or medium terms. Here the IPR regimes did matter. Indeed, the process 
revolution in the Indian pharmaceutical industry reflecting significant learning and 
technological catch up can be largely attributed to the Patent Act of 1970 allowing 
only process (and not product) patents for pharmaceutical substances. One may, of 
course, further argue that India’s transition in 2005 into a stronger IPR regime, 
compatible with the TRIPS agreement, is perhaps the right moment to leverage its 
innovative capacity to take a leap towards basic research (new drug discovery). 
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
 
If one looks at India’s economic progress in the last decade or so, it is quite evident 
that knowledge intensive sectors have been driving India’s growth, be it IT, Biotech 
or Pharmaceuticals among many more skill intensive service sectors. India’s 
technological advantages in these areas have still by and large remained confined to 
the domain of minor as opposed to major innovative capabilities. India has 
demonstrated significant competitive strength in routine (through skill intensive) tasks 
like coding (in software) or process development (in pharmaceuticals), and perhaps 
less so in creativity and innovativeness. Transition to a stronger patent regime raises 
strong hopes that it will stimulate such creative and innovative technological 
capability in India’s knowledge based industries.  
 
However, to carve out an appropriate (optimum) technology strategy for India, one 
can not afford to ignore other sectors of the economy, especially the labour intensive 
mass manufacturing where productivity augmentation through know-how capabilities 
may prove to be crucially important for sustained TFP growth and industrial 
development. While India has nurtured and succeeded (to a large extent) with high-
end human capital for technological capability, it has been accompanied with a tragic 
neglect of low end human capital investment (in primary education and health) for 
productivity gains in mass manufacturing sectors.
28 By stimulating broad based 
expansion of these sectors through low end human capital and technological 
capability building, India could bring on board its 300 million poor who have been 
completely left out of India’s prosperity through its emergence as a major economic 
player in the world economy. Such an “inclusive” technology strategy would be of 
critical importance for the sustainability of India’s growth process. 
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